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INTRODUCTION 
“In the common understanding, money laundering occurs when money 
derived from criminal activity is placed into a legitimate business in an effort 
to cleanse the money of criminal taint.”1 18 U.S.C. § 1957, however, prohibits 
a much broader range of conduct. Any person who “knowingly engages” in a 
monetary transaction involving over $10,000 of “criminally derived property” 
can be charged with money laundering under § 1957.2 
Because § 1957 eliminates the requirement found in other money 
laundering statutes that the government prove an attempt to commit a crime 
or to conceal the proceeds of a crime, § 1957 “applies to the most open,  
above-board transaction,” such as a criminal defense attorney receiving 
payment for representation.3 In response to pressure from commentators, 
 
† Comments Editor, Volume 164, University of Pennsylvania Law Review. J.D., 2016, University 
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1 United States v. Bolden, 325 F.3d 471, 486 (4th Cir. 2003); see also PRESIDENT’S COMM’N 
ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING 7 (1984) [hereinafter CASH CONNECTION] (defining 
money laundering as “the process by which one conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal 
application of income, and then disguises that income to make it appear legitimate”). 
2 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (2012). 
3 United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270, 1291 (9th Cir. 1997); see also id. (“This draconian law, 
so powerful by its elimination of criminal intent, freezes the proceeds of specific crimes out of the 
banking system.”). 
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Congress passed an amendment two years after § 1957’s enactment defining 
the term “monetary transaction” so as to exclude “any transaction necessary 
to preserve a person’s right to representation as guaranteed by the sixth 
amendment to the Constitution.”4 
The statutory safe harbor found in § 1957(f)(1) has successfully 
immunized defense attorneys from money laundering prosecutions.5 
However, United States v. Blair6 raised concerns among the criminal defense 
bar because of its holding that an attorney-defendant was not entitled to 
protection under § 1957(f)(1).7 In Blair, an attorney-defendant was convicted 
of violating § 1957 for using $20,000 in drug proceeds to purchase two $10,000 
bank checks to retain attorneys for associates of his client.8 Noting that Sixth 
Amendment rights are personal to the accused and that Blair used “someone 
else’s money” to hire counsel for others, the Fourth Circuit held that his 
actions fell “far beyond the scope of the Sixth Amendment” and were not 
protected by the safe harbor.9 In his strongly-worded dissent, Chief Judge 
Traxler criticized the court for “nullif[ying] the § 1957(f)(1) exemption and 
creat[ing] a circuit split.”10 
This Case Note discusses the implications of Blair for the criminal defense 
attorney who accepts potentially tainted funds and proposes a solution to 
ameliorate its unintended consequences. First, Part I provides relevant 
background information by discussing the money laundering statutory 
framework, the criticisms leveled at the framework as it was written, the 
Congressional response to that criticism, and § 1957(f)(1)’s application up 
until Blair. Next, Part II describes the Blair decision in detail and examines 
its implications. Part III then proposes a novel solution to the problems it 
created. Finally, the Case Note concludes with a brief word of practical advice 
for the criminal defense bar. 
 
4 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) (defining the safe harbor). 
5 See, e.g., United States v. Velez, 586 F.3d 875, 879 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that the  
attorney-defendants were not subject to criminal prosecution under § 1957(a) “because the plain 
language of § 1957(f)(1) clearly exempts criminally derived proceeds used to secure legal 
representation” as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment); see also infra subsection I.C.1.a. 
(discussing the Velez decision). 
6 661 F.3d. 755 (4th Cir. 2011). 
7 See, e.g., Alain Leibman, Unsafe Harbor—Attorneys Paid Fees from Criminal Proceeds May Be 
Charged with Money Laundering, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g=b0b3669d-b9e5-49e3-8010-1d688812cc54 [https://perma.cc/8T2R-ZKVQ] (arguing 
that Blair weakened the protection for defense attorneys against criminal prosecution when they 
accept potentially tainted funds as legal fees). 
8 Blair, 661 F.3d at 770-71. 
9 Id. at 772. 
10 Id. at 783 (Traxler, C.J., dissenting in part). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Statutory Framework 
In response to increasing public awareness of the growth in drug 
trafficking and organized crime in the 1980s, the President’s Commission on 
Organized Crime issued a report entitled The Cash Connection: Organized 
Crime, Financial Institutions, and Money Laundering.11 The report detailed the 
failings of the Bank Secrecy Act in combating money laundering and issued 
several recommendations to “provide the financial community and law 
enforcement authorities with the tools needed to . . . cause irreparable damage 
to the operations of organized crime.”12 
In response, as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Congress passed 
the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, which amended Chapter 95 of 
Title 18 of the United States Code to add §§ 1956 and 1957.13 18 U.S.C. § 1956 
criminalizes commercial transactions in which goods or services are provided 
in exchange for “dirty money.”14 Specifically, § 1956 provides that: 
(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction 
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or 
attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the 
proceeds of specified unlawful activity— 
(A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful 
activity; or . . . 
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part— 
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the 
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or 
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal 
law [shall be subject to criminal punishment].15 
The term “specified unlawful activity” is defined as to include hundreds 
of illegal activities.16 Section 1956 also criminalizes transporting or transmitting 
with certain knowledge or intent tainted monetary instruments into or out of 
the United States.17 
Section 1957, which “creates something close to strict liability for certain 
types of conduct,” prohibits transactions with financial institutions of over $10,000 
 
11 CASH CONNECTION, supra note 1. 
12 Id. at 63. 
13 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1352, 100 Stat. 3207, 3218-20. 
14 2 IAN M. COMISKY ET AL., TAX FRAUD & EVASION ¶ 11.02 (2015). 
15 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2012). 
16 Id. § 1956(c)(7). 
17 See 2 COMISKY ET AL., supra note 14 (describing the extraterritorial reach of § 1956). 
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in dirty money.18 Specifically, § 1957 provides that “[w]hoever . . . knowingly 
engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived 
property of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified 
unlawful activity [shall be subject to criminal punishment].”19 The term 
“monetary transaction” is defined as “the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or 
exchange, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of funds or a 
monetary instrument . . . by, through, or to a financial institution.”20 
Congress enacted § 1957 as a tool in the war against drugs, designed to 
“make the drug dealers’ money worthless” by criminalizing transactions in 
which participants knowingly give or accept money derived from unlawful 
activity.21 Congress specifically intended for § 1957 to reach both those who 
engage in the criminal activity generating the illicit funds and those who 
receive or handle the illicit funds in exchange for or in the course of providing 
ordinary goods or services.22 Indeed, Representative E. Clay Shaw, Jr. of the 
House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Crime commented: 
I am sick and tired of watching people sit back and say, “I am not part of the 
problem, I am not committing the crime, and, therefore, my hands are clean 
even though I know the money is dirty I am handling.[”] The only way we 
will get at this problem is to let the whole community, the whole population, 
know they are part of the problem and they could very well be convicted of 
it if they knowingly take these funds.23 
A previous House version of the bill that became the Money Laundering 
Control Act contained a provision exempting bona fide attorneys’ fees from 
the reach of § 1957 because the drafting committee was concerned that 
without such an exemption the statute would inhibit an attorney’s investigation 
 
18 Id. 
19 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (2012). 
20 Id. § 1957(f)(1). 
21 H.R. REP. NO. 99-855, pt. 1, at 13 (1986); see also Jimmy Gurulé, The Money Laundering 
Control Act of 1986: Creating a New Federal Offense or Merely Affording Federal Prosecutors an Alternative 
Means of Punishing Specified Unlawful Activity?, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 823, 853 (1995) (“The MLCA 
strikes at the economic base and lifeblood of organized crime, a critical component of any 
government strategy intended to wage a successful assault on sophisticated criminal enterprises.”); 
D. Randall Johnson, The Criminally Derived Property Statute: Constitutional and Interpretive Issues Raised by 18 
U.S.C. § 1957, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1291, 1303 (1993) (noting that “[s]ection 1957 is a money 
‘laundering’ statute only in the sense that [it allows] prosecutors to attack money laundering indirectly”). 
22 See Johnson, supra note 21, at 1293 (“Congress fully intended that the archetypical section 1957 
defendant would be the otherwise law-abiding citizen who is alleged to have simply knowingly 
accepted illegitimate funds as payment for ordinary, legitimate goods or services, or otherwise 
knowingly handled illegitimate funds while providing these services.”). 
23 H.R. REP. NO. 99-855, at 13. 
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of his client’s case.24 However, a conference committee eliminated that 
provision and § 1957 became law without any safe harbor whatsoever.25 
B. Response to § 1957 as Enacted 
The critical response to § 1957 was immediate and overwhelming. 
Commentators attacked Congress’s decision not to include a safe harbor exempting 
attorneys’ fees on three main grounds: constitutional, ethical, and practical. 
Constitutionally, commentators observed that the threat of criminal 
prosecution under § 1957 against an attorney may violate the client’s Sixth 
Amendment rights.26 Under the Sixth Amendment, criminal defendants have 
a right to competent legal representation.27 If criminal defense attorneys are 
vulnerable to prosecution for accepting legal fees that they later discover are 
tainted, attorneys may seek to shield themselves from liability by failing to 
undertake a level of investigation necessary to vigorously defend their clients, 
compromising the adversarial system.28 Both the American Bar Association 
and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) called 
upon Congress to amend the statute, arguing that the lack of a safe harbor 
 
24 See id. at 14 (stating that the bill was amended so that it “does not apply to financial 
transactions involving the bona fide fees an attorney accepts for representing a client in a criminal 
investigation or any proceeding arising therefrom”). 
25 See 132 CONG. REC. E3822 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1986) (statement of Rep. McCollum) (noting 
that in the Subcommittee’s view, the exemption was unnecessary because the risk that the 
Department of Justice would prosecute an attorney for accepting tainted funds as payment for legal 
fees was extremely minimal). 
26 See infra note 28. 
27 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (“The Sixth Amendment recognizes 
the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel’s playing a role that is critical to 
the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results. An accused is entitled to be assisted by 
an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair.”). 
28 See Lynne D. Boylston, Note, Attorneys’ Fees and the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986: 
Further Erosion of Criminal Defense Advocacy, 21 GA. L. REV. 929, 958 (1987) (“The failure to exclude 
criminal defense lawyers from the scope of section 1957 raises serious risks of impinging upon a 
criminal defendant’s sixth amendment rights and is potentially so disruptive of the attorney–client 
relationship that it will damage the adversary system by eroding the availability of the criminal 
defense bar.”); Mark R. Irvine & Daniel R. King, Comment, The Money Laundering Control Act of 
1986: Tainted Money and the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 19 PAC. L.J. 171, 174 (1987) (“[T]he new laws 
threaten the independence of the criminal defense bar, upsetting the balance achieved under an 
adversarial system.”); Alan J. Jacobs, Note, Indirect Deprivation of the Effective Assistance of Counsel: 
The Prospective Prosecution of Criminal Defense Attorneys for “Money Laundering”, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 303, 345 (1989) (“It is likely then that the attorney who fears such a discovery might avoid 
penetrating inquiry to preserve his or her own innocence.”); see also Wendy Shuck, The Impact of 
Anti-Money Laundering Laws on Attorney–Client Privilege, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 507, 
521 (1996) (comparing U.S. and Swiss anti-money-laundering laws and concluding that U.S. laws 
undermine the confidential nature of attorney–client relationships). 
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would chill the attorney–client relationship.29 In addition, they offered 
amendments to Department of Justice guidelines that would restrict 
prosecution to attorneys who “knowingly and willfully contribute to the 
ongoing activities of a criminal enterprise.”30 
Ethically, defense attorneys face the “Hobson’s choice” of either 
investigating fully but running the risk of learning that the client’s funds are 
tainted or avoiding a thorough investigation by breaching a duty owed to the 
client.31 Such a predicament creates a conflict of interest, pitting the defense 
attorney’s best interests against his client’s. Further, applying § 1957 to 
attorneys who accept bona fide legal fees creates a potential for prosecutorial 
manipulation. A prosecutor gains tremendous leverage over the defense 
attorney through § 1957, and one could use that leverage to force a defense 
attorney to withdraw from a case.32 A prosecutor also could use the leverage 
to obtain a more favorable plea bargain.33 Some commentators go so far as to 
argue that it is always unethical to represent a criminal defendant when an 
attorney believes that the defendant’s funds may be criminally derived.34 
Practically, attorneys who foresee a potential for prosecution or sanction 
are likely to refuse to represent defendants charged with certain types of 
crimes, forcing clients to use public defenders. The problem may be 
particularly acute for complex white-collar crime, an area where highly skilled, 
specialized attorneys are needed and where the client’s funds are especially 
likely to be tainted.35 Additionally, questions of fundamental fairness are 
 
29 See Paul G. Wolfteich, Note, Making Criminal Defense a Crime Under 18 U.S.C. Section 1957, 
41 VAND. L. REV. 843, 850-51 (1988) (summarizing the ABA and NACDL’s arguments). But see 
Kathleen F. Brickey, Tainted Assets and the Right to Counsel—The Money Laundering Conundrum, 66 
WASH. U. L.Q. 47, 52 (1988) (arguing that Sixth Amendment principles do not support the call for 
a blanket exemption of attorneys’ fees from § 1957). 
30 Wolfteich, supra note 29, at 866. 
31 United States v. Blair, 661 F.3d 755, 778 (4th Cir. 2011) (Traxler, C.J., dissenting in part). 
32 See Adam K. Weinstein, Note, Prosecuting Attorneys for Money Laundering: A New and 
Questionable Weapon in the War on Crime, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 369, 385-86 (1988) (“The 
money laundering provisions could be improperly used to selectively threaten prosecution or 
institute grand jury investigations and, hence, force competent defense attorneys to withdraw from 
a case due to concerns over imprisonment, ethical violations involving conflicts of interest, and 
economic pressure.”). 
33 See Jacobs, supra note 28, at 345-46 (noting that while such actions may offend an individual 
prosecutor’s own ethical code, the prosecutor’s goal of obtaining the maximum sentence while 
spending the minimum amount of time in court may override that code). 
34 See, e.g., David Orentlicher, Representing Defendants on Charges of Economic Crime: Unethical When 
Done for a Fee, 48 EMORY L.J. 1339, 1340 (1999) (arguing “that it is almost always unethical for attorneys 
to accept fees for defending individuals charged with economic crimes” and that “[s]uch individuals should 
have to rely on court-appointed counsel (or pro se representation) for their legal defense”). 
35 See Jacobs, supra note 28, at 346 (“The ultimate effect of placing so many difficulties in the 
path of a criminal defense may be to deplete the federal criminal bar. Such a depletion could 
ultimately lead to the unavailability of criminal defense attorneys, especially those skilled enough to 
defend an accused client in a complex RICO or CCE prosecution.” (footnote omitted)). 
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raised when the American taxpayer has to underwrite the legal fees of a 
defendant with many thousands of dollars in his bank account.36 
Congress heard the outcry against § 1957 loud and clear. Two years after 
the enactment of the Money Laundering Control Act, Congress amended the 
definition of “monetary transaction” in § 1957 so as to exclude “any transaction 
necessary to preserve a person’s right to representation as guaranteed by the 
sixth amendment to the Constitution.”37 
C. Pre-Blair Application of § 1957(f)(1) 
The law surrounding § 1957(f)(1) was relatively clear before the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision in Blair. Federal courts have allowed the use of § 1957(f)(1) 
to block prosecutions when the funds at issue were clearly intended to pay an 
attorney for representation in a criminal matter.38 Courts have found that 
§ 1957(f)(1) is inapplicable to both § 1956 prosecutions and when the 
defendant did not really intend to use the funds in securing legal 
representation.39 Moreover, the Department of Justice took a similar stance 
in its guidance documents, suggesting that attorneys should not be prosecuted 
under § 1957 except in exceptional circumstances.40 
1. Section 1957(f)(1) as Interpreted by the Courts 
a. Safe Harbor Held Applicable 
In United States v. Velez, the Eleventh Circuit broadly held that 
transactions involving funds used to pay for criminal representation are 
protected by the § 1957(f)(1) safe harbor.41 In Velez, the Miami-based criminal 
defense team of Fabio Ochoa, an accused Colombian drug leader, hired 
Miami attorney Benedict P. Kuehne to review the source of the funds that 
would be used to pay Ochoa’s legal fees.42 After hiring Colombian attorney 
Saldarriaga and Colombian accountant Velez, Kuehne issued an opinion letter 
concluding that several monetary transfers from Ochoa to him, as intermediary, 
 
36 See Weinstein, supra note 32, at 380 (“It seems grossly unfair that tax dollars should be spent 
to pay the legal fees of a wealthy defendant in order to protect his attorney from prosecution.”). 
37 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6182, 102 Stat. 4181, 4354 (amending 
18 U.S.C § 1957(f)(1)). 
38 See generally infra subsection I.C.1 (discussing the federal courts’ application of § 1957(f)(1)). 
39 See infra subsection I.C.1. 
40 See generally infra subsection I.C.2 (discussing the Department of Justice’s application of § 1957(f)(1)). 
41 586 F.3d 875, 879 (11th Cir. 2009). 
42 Id. at 876. 
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were not derived from criminal activity.43 Kuehne then transferred the fees, 
totaling about $5.3 million, back to Ochoa’s defense team.44 
The government charged Kuehne and his co-defendants with money 
laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(h) and 1957, on the theory that 
he and his co-defendants supported the opinion letter with false documents 
and statements, “knowing that the funds were criminally derived and 
intending to conceal their true source.”45 The trial court granted a motion to 
dismiss on the grounds that the plain language of § 1957(f)(1) barred the 
prosecution because the transaction was necessary to preserve a person’s right 
to representation as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.46 The Eleventh 
Circuit reviewed to determine the meaning of § 1957(f)(1), an issue of first 
impression in the circuit.47 
Affirming the trial court, the Eleventh Circuit held that “the plain 
meaning of the exemption set forth in § 1957(f)(1), when considered in its 
context, is that transactions involving criminally derived proceeds are exempt 
from the prohibitions of § 1957(a) when they are for the purpose of securing 
legal representation to which an accused is entitled under the Sixth 
Amendment.”48 In interpreting the safe harbor’s reference to the Sixth 
Amendment, the court noted that the exemption does not extend to 
circumstances in which a defendant is not constitutionally entitled to 
representation, as in a civil matter.49 The court asserted that “it is the 
representation itself—not the transaction—that must be guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment before the statutory exemption may be applied.”50 
In Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, the Supreme Court held 
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not protect the right of a 
criminal defendant to use criminally derived proceeds for legal fees.51 The 
government argued that Caplin & Drysdale “nullified” or “vitiated” the 
§ 1957(f)(1) safe harbor.52 However, the court in Velez held that since Caplin 
& Drysdale involved a federal drug forfeiture statute without a safe harbor, it 
had “no bearing” on the case at hand.53 
 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 877. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 879. 
51 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989). 
52 Velez, 586 F.3d at 877-79. 
53 Id.; see also United States v. Ferguson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1357-58 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (holding 
that Caplin & Drysdale did not apply because Caplin & Drysdale addressed a drug forfeiture statute 
without a safe harbor, as opposed to § 1957). 
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b. Safe Harbor Held Inapplicable 
In United States v. Elso, the Eleventh Circuit held that § 1957(f)(1) is 
inapplicable to money-laundering prosecutions brought under § 1956.54 The 
defendant attorney was charged with money laundering and conspiracy 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and (ii) and § 1956(h) for “engaging 
in a transaction involving drug proceeds knowing that the transaction was 
designed . . . to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or 
control of the money.”55 Specifically, the government alleged that Elso had 
concealed drug proceeds for two of his friends, Andy and Rudy Diaz, cocaine 
importers whom Elso had represented in the past.56 
According to the government, Andy Diaz visited Elso’s office after 
delivering nearly $500,000 in drug money to an undercover agent posing as a 
drug courier, stating that law enforcement was following him.57 When Diaz 
“expressed concern that law enforcement agents would discover and seize” 
additional drug money hidden in a safe in his home, Elso retrieved $266,800 
in cash from Diaz’s safe, put it in a briefcase, and attempted to bring it back 
to his law office.58 He refused to stop when law enforcement agents attempted 
to pull him over, continuing to flee “until he was blocked by traffic.”59 
On appeal, Elso challenged his money laundering convictions, claiming 
that the court’s failure to give his requested jury instruction prevented him 
from advancing a § 1957(f)(1) defense that the money he removed from Diaz’s 
home was a legal fee.60 He argued that the § 1957(f)(1) exception is “designed 
to preserve a constitutional right—the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,” 
and is therefore “highly relevant to a § 1956 defense in which the ‘transaction’ 
is claimed to be an attorney’s fee.”61 The court reasoned that even if the 
transaction involved attorneys’ fees, it was irrelevant whether Elso knew and 
intended that the transaction was designed to cover up “the nature, the 
location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified 
unlawful activity.”62 Therefore, the court held the § 1957(f)(1) safe harbor 
provision inapplicable to money laundering prosecutions brought under § 1956.63 
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit limited the reach of the § 1957(f)(1) safe 
harbor in United States v. Hoogenboom, holding that the provision only applies 
 
54 422 F.3d 1305, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 2005). 
55 Id. at 1307. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 1308. 
61 Id. at 1309. 
62 Id. at 1310. 
63 Id. at 1309-10. 
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when a client pays an attorney with the “present intent” to exercise Sixth 
Amendment rights.64 In Hoogenboom, the defendant, a psychologist, was 
convicted of money laundering under § 1957 and several charges arising from 
her fraudulent billing of Medicare.65 Once she realized that the FBI was 
investigating her billing practices, she withdrew $101,000 from one of the bank 
accounts in which she deposited illicit funds.66 
On appeal, Hoogenboom argued that since she eventually used the money 
to pay her attorneys, the withdrawals were covered by § 1957(f)(1) and should 
not be considered “monetary transactions.”67 The court described her argument 
as “preposterous.”68 According to the court, under the defendant’s reading of 
the safe harbor provision, defendants could circumvent a § 1957 money 
laundering charge simply by channeling the illegally obtained money “toward 
their defense.”69 The court noted that the safe harbor provision should be read 
“to prevent the broad reach of the statute from criminalizing a defendant’s 
bona fide payment to her attorney.”70 Since the evidence showed that 
Hoogenboom emptied her account to prevent the FBI from seizing her funds 
and not with the “present intent” to exercise Sixth Amendment rights, 
Hoogenboom’s behavior did not fit within the § 1957(f)(1) safe harbor.71 
2. Section 1957(f)(1) as Interpreted by the Department of Justice 
Section 9-105 of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual prescribes certain approval, 
consultation, and notification requirements when the various U.S. Attorney’s 
Offices file indictments or criminal complaints containing money laundering 
charges.72 According to the Manual, § 1957(f)(1) does not bar prosecution of 
a defense attorney who receives and deposits tainted funds as part of a “sham 
or fraudulent transaction” or as legal fees for representation of a client in a 
non-criminal matter.73 
Nonetheless, the Manual advises federal prosecutors that prosecution of 
an attorney under § 1957 is a “highly sensitive area and must be approached 
 
64 209 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2000). 
65 Id. at 666-68. 
66 Id. at 668. 
67 Id. at 669. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-105.100 (1997) 
[hereinafter UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL], https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-
105000-money-laundering [https://perma.cc/A4J6-TTF6] (describing the purpose of the Department 
of Justice requirements). 
73 Id. § 9-105.600. 
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with great care.”74 Specifically, Department of Justice policy is that attorneys 
should not be prosecuted under § 1957 based on the receipt of bona fide legal 
fees for legitimate representation in a criminal matter, unless:  
(1) [T]here is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the attorney had actual 
knowledge of the illegal origin of the specific property received (prosecution 
is not permitted if the only proof of knowledge is evidence of willful 
blindness); and (2) such evidence does not consist of (a) confidential 
communications made by the client preliminary to and with regard to 
undertaking representation in the criminal matter; or (b) confidential 
communications made during the course of representation in the criminal 
matter; or (c) other information obtained by the attorney during the course 
of the representation and in furtherance of the obligation to effectively 
represent the client.75 
In applying the policy, prosecutors must examine: “(1) what constitutes 
bona fide fees; (2) what constitutes actual knowledge; and (3) what evidence 
may be relied upon to meet the knowledge requirement of the policy.”76 The 
key question in determining if a fee is bona fide is “whether the fee was paid 
in good faith without fraud or deceit for representation concerning the 
defendant’s personal criminal liability.”77 Actual knowledge may only be 
established if the prosecutor has proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
funds are derived from “specified unlawful activity” and that “the attorney 
actually knew” the funds were criminally derived.78 Actual knowledge cannot 
be proved by “confidential communications” made by the client during the 
course of the representation or resulting from inquiries about whether the 
attorney will undertake the representation.79 It also cannot be proved by 
information that the attorney obtained “during the course” and “in furtherance 
of” the representation.80 
 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id.  
77 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, CRIMINAL RESOURCE 
MANUAL 2102. 
78 Id. at 2103. 
79 Id. at 2104. 
80 Id. 
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Some have argued that Congress should amend § 1957 to incorporate 
these standards directly into the text of the statute.81 Such advocates also 
argue that the standards should be extended to representation in civil matters.82 
While the Department of Justice guidelines may seem reassuring, the 
United States Attorneys’ Manual is merely guidance and does not “create any 
rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any 
matter civil or criminal.”83 Indeed, the prosecution of Benedict Kuehne in 
Velez was contrary to Department of Justice policy. Jon May, former chair of 
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers’ White Collar Crime 
Committee, wrote in 2010 about his belief that the government “is unlikely 
[to] ever again prosecute another criminal defense lawyer for the receipt of 
tainted fees intended to pay for legal services.”84 Unfortunately, only one year 
later, the government came dangerously close. 
II. UNITED STATES V. BLAIR AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
A. Factual Background 
Anthony Rankine and several associates “operated a large marijuana 
distribution ring.”85 At one point in August 2003, Elizabeth Nicely Simpson 
(Nicely) agreed to store Rankine’s safe in her house.86 After Rankine, his 
girlfriend, and her son were murdered within a several-week period, Nicely 
“became aware that the safe contained drug money.”87 Realizing that she could 
be in danger, she moved the safe to a storage facility.88 When she began 
receiving threatening phone calls, she confided in a co-worker who advised 
her to contact Walter L. Blair, a Maryland criminal defense attorney.89 Like 
Rankine and Nicely, Blair was a native of Jamaica.90 
After Nicely called Blair and explained that she was holding a safe with 
Rankine’s drug money, Blair asked Nicely to “come to his office for a face-to-face 
 
81 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 21, at 1297 (arguing that “incorporation of current Justice 
Department prosecution standards” into § 1957 would better serve the Sixth Amendment). 
82 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 1356 (“The separation of legal services into service 
for civil and criminal representation is analytically unsound for purposes of determining the extent to 
which section 1957 threatens the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation in a criminal matter.”). 
83 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 72, § 1-1.000 (2009). 
84 Jon May, Attorney Fees and Government Forfeiture: How to Get Paid, Keep the Fee, and Not 
Become a Target of the Friendly Neighborhood Federal Prosecutor, CHAMPION, Apr. 2010, at 20, 25. 
85 United States v. Blair, 661 F.3d 755, 759 (4th Cir. 2011). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 759-60. 
90 Id. at 760. 
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appointment.”91 She and her co-worker did so, and under Blair’s advice, 
returned the next day with a duffle bag full of the safe’s cash.92 Blair and the 
co-worker counted approximately $170,000 in cash outside the presence of Nicely, 
but when Nicely returned Blair told her that there was around $70,000 in the bag.93 
Blair and Nicely agreed to proceed in several steps. First, Blair concocted 
a cover story for Nicely: she would pretend that the cash was “partner money,” 
part of a familiar Jamaican asset pooling arrangement.94 Second, Blair set up 
a real estate corporation for Nicely, “through which she could use some of the 
money to buy properties.”95 Finally, Blair told Nicely to “set aside money to 
cover the legal fees” for two of Rankine’s associates, Saunders and Bernard, 
who had been arrested on drug charges.96 After paying a mortgage broker 
$9,000 to find and purchase real estate on behalf of Nicely, Blair retained the 
remainder of the money and kept control of it “from that point forward.”97 
Next, Blair contacted two Virginia attorneys, David Boone and James 
Yoffy, “in an effort to secure representation” for Saunders and Bernard.98 
Then, “Boone agreed to represent Saunders as co-counsel with Blair, and 
Yoffy agreed to represent Bernard.”99 Blair used the cash to purchase a $10,000 
cashier’s check for each of the lawyers, and he “retained $10,000 for himself 
as co-counsel.”100 
Based on this and other evidence, Blair was convicted of several charges, 
including money laundering in violation of § 1957, which prohibits knowingly 
engaging in a monetary transaction with more than $10,000 in criminally 
derived property.101 On appeal, Blair challenged the district court’s denial of 
his motion to dismiss the § 1957 money laundering count on the theory that 
§ 1957(f)(1) bars his prosecution because he used the funds to secure legal 
representation for Saunders and Bernard.102 
 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. In a system of “partner money,” the “partners” regularly contribute a certain amount of 
money to a common pool of funds, and the “banker” distributes the funds until each partner has 
received a “draw.” The system allows low-income individuals to obtain funding that they could not 
otherwise obtain. Id. at 760-61. 
95 Id. at 761. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 770-71. 
102 Id. at 771. 
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B. The Decision 
In a 2–1 opinion, the Fourth Circuit held that Blair’s conduct did not fall 
within the § 1957(f)(1) safe harbor.103 The majority’s opinion rested primarily 
on § 1957(f)(1)’s use of the words “as guaranteed by the sixth amendment” to 
describe the exempted transactions.104 The majority held that in choosing to 
tie the safe harbor to Sixth Amendment rights, rather than exempting 
transactions “for payment of counsel,” Congress intended for “the scope of 
the safe harbor provision [to be] shaped by the Supreme Court’s ongoing 
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment.”105 
To the Fourth Circuit, Blair’s conduct fell outside of the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantees because he used “someone else’s unlawful drug 
proceeds to pay for counsel for others.”106 In reaching this decision, the 
Fourth Circuit came to a fundamentally different conclusion regarding the 
applicability of Caplin & Drysdale than the Eleventh Circuit did in Velez. The 
Velez court took Caplin & Drysdale to apply only to cases involving 21 U.S.C. 
§ 853(c), the federal drug forfeiture statute, and to mean that the Sixth 
Amendment does not protect the right of a criminal defendant to use illegally 
obtained proceeds for legal fees.107 However, according to the dissent, the 
Blair majority hung its hat on Caplin & Drysdale’s categorical rule that “[a] 
defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to spend another person’s money 
for services rendered by an attorney.”108 In so construing Caplin & Drysdale, 
the Fourth Circuit had no problem applying it to the money-laundering 
statute at issue in Blair. Responding to Blair’s argument that such an 
interpretation would render § 1957(f)(1) meaningless, the majority noted 
simply that Congress was well aware of that possibility when it tied the 
§ 1957(f)(1) safe harbor to the Sixth Amendment.109 
C. The Dissent 
Chief Judge Traxler authored a vigorous dissent criticizing the majority 
for ignoring the § 1957(f)(1) exception and causing a circuit split.110 Like the 
 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 United States v. Velez, 586 F.3d 875, 877-78 (11th Cir. 2009). 
108 Blair, 661 F.3d at 781 (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 
626 (1989)); see also Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 171 n.2 (2001) (“The Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel is personal to the defendant and specific to the offense.”). 
109 See Blair, 661 F.3d at 774 (“It is more prudent and respectful of congressional design to 
leave these contestable questions to the Sixth Amendment standard adopted by Congress and 
interpreted by the Supreme Court.”). 
110 Id. at 783 (Traxler, C.J., dissenting in part). 
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majority, Chief Judge Traxler began his analysis by looking to the text of 
§ 1957(f)(1) and its reference to the Sixth Amendment, acknowledging that 
the safe harbor does not extend to the civil context.111 The dissent quickly 
departed from the majority, however, by concluding that the safe harbor provision 
“does not require the transaction itself [to] be constitutionally protected,” but rather 
that “the representation . . . come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee.”112 
According to Chief Judge Traxler, common sense dictates that the 
transaction itself need not be protected by the Sixth Amendment to fall 
within the safe harbor. Rather, the transaction must be “‘necessary’ to secure a 
person’s Sixth Amendment right to representation” because it would make 
little sense for Congress to protect something already constitutionally 
protected.113 Whether a transaction is necessary to secure a person’s right to 
representation depends on the circumstances.114 
To highlight that some transactions are not needed to secure a person’s 
Sixth Amendment rights, the dissent invoked examples of a retainer to 
provide ongoing legal advice and the payment of an unreasonably large fee in 
light of the transaction.115 Chief Judge Traxler cited Hoogenboom for the 
proposition that a defendant must “engag[e] in a transaction . . . with the 
present intent of exercising Sixth Amendment rights” for the safe harbor to 
apply.116 The majority criticized pegging the scope of the exemption to the 
word “necessary” rather than to the Sixth Amendment on the grounds that it 
would create a “shadow jurisprudence apart from text and precedent” in 
which lower court judges would be making arbitrary determinations with 
unclear guidance.117 The dissent concluded that Blair’s conduct in purchasing 
two $10,000 bank checks and using them to secure representation for Saunders 
and Bernard was necessary to preserve Sixth Amendment rights.118 
The dissent also attacked the majority’s position that § 1957(f)(1) only 
applies if a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to use the funds and its 
conclusion under Caplin & Drysdale that Blair had no such right because the 
Sixth Amendment does not protect the use of someone else’s property to 
retain counsel.119 Such an interpretation, the dissent asserted, renders 
§ 1957(f)(1) largely meaningless because every transaction that might come 
 
111 Id. at 779. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 779 (citing United States v. Hoogenboom, 209 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
117 Id. at 774 (majority opinion). 
118 Id. at 779-80 (Traxler, C.J., dissenting in part). 
119 Id. at 780-81. 
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within § 1957(f)(1) by definition involves criminally derived proceeds.120 The 
majority responded that its reading of § 1957(f)(1), which only covers 
constitutionally protected transactions, does not necessarily fly in the face of 
Congressional intent or the words of the statute because Congress often 
enacts statutes tracking constitutional boundaries.121 The majority worried 
about drug lords and organized crime bosses underwriting counsel for their 
associates, creating serious conflicts of interest for defense attorneys.122 Chief 
Judge Traxler contended that the potential for conflicts of interest was 
overstated because “it is well understood that the attorney’s loyalty is to his 
client,” not the payer of the fee.123 
Like the Velez court, the dissent insisted that Caplin & Drysdale does not 
apply to § 1957(f)(1) because it speaks only to a drug forfeiture statute that 
does not have a corresponding safe harbor for attorneys’ fees.124 As applied to 
Blair, the dissent would hold that Blair’s securing criminal defense attorneys 
for Saunders and Bernard was exempt from prosecution under § 1957(f)(1).125 
The majority countered that to apply § 1957(f) to Blair would “invite the 
worst kind of abuses.”126 Perhaps this is a case of bad facts making bad law. 
The court noted that if Blair could “navigate into any safe harbor” under 
“heinous circumstances such as these, the ‘safe harbor’ would become a safe 
ocean, and the statutory exception would swamp the rule.”127 
D. Implications of the Decision 
1. The Attorney–Client Relationship 
The decision in Blair also resurrects the chief problem that § 1957(f)(1) 
was designed to ameliorate—the inevitable chilling of the attorney–client 
relationship resulting from a system in which the criminal defense attorney 
has an incentive to avoid investigating fully his client’s case.128 Blair implies a 
legal duty for defense lawyers to thoroughly investigate the legitimacy of the 
 
120 See id. at 781 (“Since any transaction that comes within § 1957(f)(1)’s safe harbor will 
necessarily involve criminally derived proceeds, the government’s position effectively reads this 
provision out of the statute.”). 
121 See id. at 774 (majority opinion) (citing Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, § 104, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 
122 Id. at 775. 
123 Id. at 780 (Traxler, C.J., dissenting in part); see also infra subsection II.D.2 (discussing third 
party payments of attorneys’ fees). 
124 Blair, 661 F.3d at 782 (Traxler, C.J., dissenting in part). 
125 Id. at 779-80. 
126 Id. at 775 (majority opinion). 
127 Id. at 773. 
128 See supra Section I.B. (discussing in detail the constitutional, ethical, and practical problems 
caused by the Blair decision). 
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source of their fees. However, many lawyers understandably may avoid asking 
this question to new clients, on the grounds that it would undermine the trust 
the lawyer is seeking to build with the client, or simply because the question 
is uncomfortable. At any rate, a client is likely to state that even the dirtiest 
funds are clean, and the lawyer would have to investigate further anyway.129 
Accordingly, the criminal defense lawyer simply is not likely to inquire into 
the source of funds directly from the client. 
Blair may also stifle communication between the lawyer and the client 
throughout the representation. In addition to lawyers failing to ask the 
questions, clients may not be as open because they might fear that the lawyer 
could be forced to provide the government with information harmful to their 
interests.130 Further, lawyers may feel less able to provide fulsome advice to 
their clients because they fear flips or stings.131 
Even before Blair, many commentators believed that the safe harbor was 
largely toothless. Significantly, because the right to counsel generally does 
not attach until indictment,132 the safe harbor is not likely to apply until 
then.133 This limitation significantly curtails any protections that the safe 
harbor might offer because a large number of criminal defendants, especially 
white-collar defendants, are likely to seek counsel after the commencement 
of an investigation but before indictment. The white-collar defense lawyer in 
that situation would not wait until either indictment or until the government 
walks away to collect his fee. Because of this timing issue, Professors Gaetke 
and Welling have cautioned that the reach of the safe harbor, even before 
Blair, “should not be overstated” and hypothesized that Congress’s purpose 
in adopting the exception “must have been not so much to make a substantive 
change in the law but to make a political statement, to signal its concern about 
the constitutional implications of prosecuting criminal defense lawyers.”134 
Nonetheless, improvements can be made to restore the § 1957(f)(1) safe 
harbor to at least the position it was in before the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Blair. 
 
129 See Eugene R. Gaetke & Sarah N. Welling, Money Laundering and Lawyers, 43 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 1165, 1183 (1992) (“Lawyers who ask the explicit question about whether the fees were 
criminally derived will have to explain to the client why they are asking such a question. The 
explanation will likely signal the client that the right answer in terms of the client’s interest is that 
it is clean. Thus the client’s response to the direct question may not be reliable.” (footnote omitted)). 
130 Id. at 1225-29. 
131 Id. at 1229-33. 
132 See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 198 (2008) (holding that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel attaches at the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings). 
133 See Gaetke & Welling, supra note 129, at 1171 (“A criminal defense lawyer who deposits 
tainted fees from an unindicted client may not be protected by the exception.”). 
134 Id. 
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2. Third Party Payments 
Perhaps the most significant result of Blair is its implication for practitioners 
whose clients’ legal bills are paid by third parties. In extending Caplin & 
Drysdale’s conclusion that there is no right to spend another person’s money 
for legal defense from applying only to the drug forfeiture context to money 
laundering, the Blair majority ignored the simple reality that there are many 
legitimate instances where legal bills are paid by third parties.135 
Blair held that the defendant’s actions fell outside of the safe harbor 
largely because the defendant secured representation for two third parties, 
Saunders and Bernard.136 The majority was concerned about § 1957(f)(1) 
“empowering a drug lord to sprinkle money around to hire counsel for his 
underlings.”137 According to the majority, allowing such transactions ignores 
the fact that the Sixth Amendment is personal to the accused and would 
undermine the attorney–client relationship by confusing the lawyer as to 
where his “allegiance [should] lie.”138 
The dissent countered that there is no basis in the statute for concluding 
that the safe harbor provision only applies if the transaction was to secure the 
payer’s Sixth Amendment rights.139 Indeed, the statute reads that a transaction 
comes within the safe harbor if it is “necessary to preserve a person’s right to 
representation as guaranteed by the sixth amendment.”140 Fundamental 
principles of professional responsibility dictate that the attorney’s allegiance 
is to his client and not to any third party fee-payer.141 
The majority’s analysis makes sense in organized crime and drug cases. 
However, because the analysis applies equally to legitimate third party 
payments, it cuts too broadly. Consider the case of a company agreeing to pay 
legal fees for one of its employees embroiled in employment-related litigation, 
as in United States v. Stein.142 Stein involved the accounting firm KPMG, which 
 
135 See THOMAS D. MORGAN, ABA, LAWYER LAW § 4.E.1 (2007) (listing as examples of 
legitimate third party payment situations “an insurance company fulfill[ing] its contractual obligation 
to provide legal representation to an insured person,” a family member paying the legal bills of a close 
relative, and “a company pay[ing] the legal bills of [its] employee for an event related to the employment”). 
136 United States v. Blair, 661 F.3d 755, 772 (4th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Ferguson, 
142 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (noting in dicta that the § 1957(f)(1) safe harbor is not 
an absolute bar to prosecutions where criminally derived money is used to pay attorneys’ fees and 
may not extend to third party payments). 
137 Blair, 661 F.3d at 772. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 780 (Traxler, C.J., dissenting in part). 
140 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1)). 
141 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. ¶¶ 11–12 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) 
(mandating that attorneys who are paid by third parties must obtain consent from the client and 
decline representation if the arrangement creates a conflict of interest). 
142 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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had a longstanding policy to pay for the legal defense of its personnel in 
employment-related litigation.143 In Stein, it was likely that all of the 
defendants had contractual and other legal rights to indemnification and 
advancement of legal costs from KPMG.144 The indictment in Stein was 
dismissed because the government pressured KPMG to cut off the defendants’ 
legal funding in violation of their Sixth Amendment rights.145 
In Stein, the government attempted to analogize to Caplin & Drysdale by 
arguing that the defendants had no right to spend “other people’s money.”146 
However, the court noted that Caplin & Drysdale protects a defendant’s right 
to spend his own money on a defense, and here KPMG’s money was in “every 
material sense” the defendants’ money because of the defendants’ expectation 
that KPMG would cover the legal fees associated with their defense.147 
The Stein holding that certain individuals have a right for their legal fees 
to be paid by a third party is significant. It is not hard to imagine a situation 
in which the funds that a corporation intends to pay as legal fees are 
potentially tainted. For example, a corporation could be under investigation 
for fraud, and the funds used to pay for an employee’s defense could very well 
be derived from that fraud. Still, it would make little sense to force an 
individual employee to pay the legal fees himself, despite his employer’s 
obligation to pay those fees, simply because some of the funds in the 
corporate coffers may be tainted. In all likelihood, the individual would be 
foreclosed from counsel of his choice. The same goes for a low or middle class 
individual whose legal fees are paid by a family member who, unbeknownst 
to the individual, made his fortune long ago through illicit means. 
In these cases, prosecuting attorneys for accepting the funds would do 
nothing to further the goals of the Money Laundering Control Act, yet these 
prosecutions would be allowed after Blair. In these examples, the defense 
attorney who accepts funds to represent an individual in a criminal case has 
every reason to believe that the funds are probably clean. If it turns out later 
 
143 Id. at 335-40. Such an arrangement is a longstanding part of the law. See Homestore, Inc. 
v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 218 (Del. 2005) (noting that advancement of legal fees “is actually a desirable 
underwriting of risk by the corporation in anticipation of greater corporate-wide rewards for its 
shareholders. The broader salient benefits that the public policy . . . seeks to accomplish . . . will 
only be achieved if the promissory terms of advancement contracts are enforced by courts even when 
corporate officials . . . are accused of serious misconduct.” (footnote omitted)); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 438(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (discussing the principal’s duty to 
indemnify the agent); see also id. at cmt. e (describing the modern common law rule which extends 
to payment of expenses incurred by an employee in defending a lawsuit with respect to which the 
employee is entitled to indemnity). 
144 See Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 356 n.119 (describing an implied contract stemming from 
KPMG’s past practice). 
145 Id. at 382. 
146 Id. at 367. 
147 Id. 
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that the funds were dirty, the proposed safe harbor still authorizes prosecution 
of the payer for engaging in a transaction involving more than $10,000 in 
criminally derived proceeds. However, his lawyer would be protected, even if 
he came to know through investigating his client’s case that the funds were 
actually criminally derived. 
Commentators have been critical of defense attorneys who accept third 
party fees. Professor Orentlicher has suggested that the legal community 
should adopt a presumption that a lawyer who accepts a third party payment 
for a defendant in an organized crime ring is advancing the conspiracy by 
accepting that payment.148 Certainly, the likelihood that the fee payer in an 
organized crime case is a collaborator in the crime is very high and the funds 
are deserving of extra scrutiny. However, Professor Orentlicher also calls for 
strict analysis when an ordinary family member pays a legal fee.149 While 
Professor Orentlicher acknowledges arguments that a strong duty of inquiry 
may chill the attorney–client relationship, he argues that such a concern does 
not justify a lawyer’s blind acceptance of third party fees because lawyers have 
a duty not to participate in client crime and because defendants can always 
rely on court-appointed counsel.150 
3. Forfeiture of Legal Fees 
After Caplin & Drysdale, it has been clear that a defendant has no legal 
right to spend drug proceeds to obtain legal services. Caplin & Drysdale 
involved the federal drug forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853, which mandates 
that any person convicted of certain drug offenses must forfeit any proceeds 
or instrumentalities from that violation.151 This should not come as a surprise 
because the drug proceeds do not really belong to the defendant, but by law 
become property of the federal government as soon as the defendant commits 
the violation.152 Once the government proves that the funds were both 
forfeitable and transferred to the lawyer after the date of the crime, the 
lawyer’s only possible defense is the bona fide purchaser defense, in which he 
 
148 See David Orentlicher, Fee Payments to Criminal Defense Lawyers from Third Parties: Revisiting 
United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1083, 1091-92 (2000) (suggesting that 
such a presumption could be rebutted by a showing that the fee payer had no connection to the 
crime ring, that the defendant was falsely accused of participating in the crime ring, or that the 
payment was not tied to the defendant’s participation in the conspiracy). 
149 See id. at 1095-96 (arguing that defense lawyers in such a case assume the burden of confirming 
that more likely than not the payment from the family member is not tied to the criminal activity). 
150 Id. at 1098. 
151 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (2012). 
152 Id. § 853(c). 
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must prove that at the time he received the fee he was “reasonably without 
cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture.”153 
The Department of Justice’s United States Attorneys’ Manual attempts 
to put boundaries around this expansive power. Specifically, the Manual 
specifies that assets transferred to an attorney as legal fees may only be subject 
to forfeiture when “the transfer was a fraudulent or sham transaction.”154 In 
addition, forfeiture may be pursued if “the attorney had actual knowledge” that 
the assets were forfeitable, excluding any information disclosed during the course 
of representation.155 Forfeiture is also authorized in civil matters if the attorney 
had reasonable grounds “to know that the asset was subject to forfeiture.”156 
The Sixth Amendment arguments raised in the context of § 1957(f)(1) 
are equally applicable here.157 If criminal defense attorneys will not take 
certain types of cases for fear of having their legal fees disgorged, and  
court-appointed counsel are unable to handle complex cases, criminal defendants 
may be denied their right to effective assistance of counsel.158 Additionally, 
since the Department of Justice standards are nonbinding, some fear that the 
government will not follow its own guidelines.159 
The government shows no sign of reining in its forfeiture activities.160 
Accordingly, criminal defense attorneys need to take adequate precautions to 
 
153 Id.; see also id. § 853(n)(6) (defining the bona fide purchaser defense); United States v. 92 
Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111, 129 (1993) (plurality opinion) (concluding that transferees can assert 
the innocent owner defense to protect interests in property acquired after the illegal transaction 
giving rise to the forfeiture). 
154 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 72, § 9-120.102 (2010). 
155 Id. § 9-120.104 (2010). 
156 Id. § 9-120.103 (2010). For a discussion of forfeiture of attorneys’ fees in a civil case, see 
FTC v. Assail, Inc., 410 F.3d 256, 265 (5th Cir. 2005) (explaining that when an attorney is “on notice 
that his fees may derive from a pool of frozen assets, he has a duty to make a good faith inquiry into 
the source of those fees,” or failure to do so “will result in disgorgement”). 
157 See generally William J. Genego, The Legal and Practical Implications of Forfeiture of Attorneys’ 
Fees, 36 EMORY L.J. 837 (1987) (discussing constitutional concerns posed by forfeiture of attorneys’ fees). 
158 See Michael J. Sharp, Comment, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States: The 
Supreme Court’s Decision that Crime Doesn’t Pay—Even for Attorneys’ Fees!, 24 GA. L. REV. 137, 146-47 
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forfeiture because a system in which those assets are forfeitable violates both defendants’ right to 
counsel under the Sixth Amendment and due process under the Fifth Amendment). 
159 See Morgan Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys’ Fees: Applying an Institutional Role Theory to 
Define Individual Constitutional Rights, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 1, 43 (arguing that there are “very real 
dangers” of government abuse of forfeiture procedures); Genego, supra note 157, at 844 (suggesting 
that the Department of Justice “guidelines can be seen as an aspect of litigation strategy”—the 
Department of Justice carefully selects fee forfeiture cases, and if it obtains a favorable ruling in one 
of those cases, the number of forfeiture actions is likely to greatly increase). 
160 See Matthew R. Lasky, Comment, Imposing Indigence: Reclaiming the Qualified Right to 
Counsel of Choice in Criminal Asset Forfeiture Cases, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 165, 169 (2014) 
(“Today, [the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act] is used indiscriminately and in a way that deprives 
defendants of a meaningful legal defense.”). But see Thomas S. Kearney, Comment, The Constitutional 
Retrenchment in the Use of Forfeiture: Are Attorney Fee Forfeitures Destined to Go the Way of the Horse and 
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protect themselves. Some prominent defense attorneys have suggested that 
criminal defense attorneys should always prepare a retainer agreement signed 
by the client noting that the attorney has been assured that the fee comes 
from completely legitimate sources.161 Other commentators have suggested 
that defense attorneys accept an initial non-refundable retainer.162 
III. A PROPOSAL 
In defense of its broad holding, the majority posited that the fact that 
Blair was a lawyer was “pure coincidence” and it had “never suggested that 
the attorneys hired for Saunders and Bernard” should be prosecuted.163 
According to the majority, a violation of § 1957 would be “apparent” if Blair 
“were simply the head of a drug organization who decided to bankroll 
lawyers” for his underlings with drug proceeds.164 Perhaps the fact that Blair 
was an attorney was irrelevant to the majority’s reasoning. Nonetheless, the 
Blair majority’s clear holding that the use of $10,000 or more in criminally 
derived funds to secure legal representation for another person is a violation 
of § 1957 has broad implications for the criminal defense attorney who accepts 
potentially tainted funds. While Blair was not prosecuted in a representative 
capacity and Saunders and Bernard’s lawyers were not prosecuted at all, the 
Blair holding opens the door to § 1957 prosecutions of attorneys who accept 
tainted funds. If transmitting over $10,000 in criminally derived funds for 
legal representation is a violation of § 1957, the way the statute is currently 
written dictates that the same would be true for receiving those funds. 
Blair’s negative implications for the attorney–client relationship, third 
party payments, and forfeiture of legal fees can be ameliorated most 
effectively by statute. However, the risks facing the attorney vary based on the 
potential client’s situation, and a statute seeking to protect the attorney from 
those risks needs to differentiate based on whether or not the potential client is 
already under indictment or has had a civil forfeiture complaint filed against him. 
The risk that a criminal defense attorney will be prosecuted for accepting 
potentially tainted funds from a client who is not yet under indictment can 
 
Buggy?, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1069, 1110-16 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision 
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161 See May, supra note 84, at 26 (noting that taking this step is best practice but may not be 
enough to completely protect an attorney from prosecution). 
162 See Sharp, supra note 158, at 159 (“By accepting this up-front fee, the defense attorney will 
have had no way of knowing whether or not the funds received were ‘tainted,’ and consequently, 
could not possibly have notice that these particular funds were subject to forfeiture.”). But see May, 
supra note 84, at 22 (noting that “the ethics of non-refundable retainers are controversial”). 
163 United States v. Blair, 661 F.3d 755, 773 (4th Cir. 2011). 
164 Id. 
2016] Of Laundering and Legal Fees 201 
be mitigated by a simple statutory amendment to § 1957, with a parallel 
amendment to § 1956. The risks that a criminal defense attorney faces when 
he accepts potentially tainted funds from a client already facing an indictment 
or civil forfeiture complaint for a violation of an offense likely to lead to 
tainted funds, however, are more significant because indictments and 
complaints give the attorney actual knowledge that the client’s funds are 
potentially tainted. To mitigate the risk present in such a case, Congress 
should enact a statute requiring that the client be referred to a magistrate 
judge or special master, who would determine a reasonable fee that the client 
could pay the attorney out of the tainted funds. Only with such a 
Congressional response can attorneys feel comfortable representing criminal 
defendants whose funds are potentially tainted. 
A. Pre-Indictment 
Situations in which the potential client has not yet been indicted present 
a lower level of risk because there is no document informing the defense 
attorney that the potential client’s funds may be tainted. A statutory 
amendment to § 1957, with a parallel amendment to § 1956, should be enacted 
to protect attorneys from criminal liability for accepting bona fide legal fees 
to provide representation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Such an 
amendment would allow for prosecution of those who pay legal fees with 
criminally derived funds, but would exempt attorneys who receive those 
funds as long as they believe that it is more likely than not that the funds are 
legitimate and are being used to represent a defendant in a criminal matter. 
It would allow the defense attorney to fully investigate his client’s case 
without worrying that any damning evidence he finds may be used against 
him. Under the proposed amendment, Blair still would be subject to prosecution 
under § 1957. Accordingly, the amendment mollifies the Blair majority’s justified 
concern that applying § 1957(f)(1) to shield a character like Blair from 
prosecution would invite abuse.165 However, any lawyer who accepted those funds 
with a belief that they were bona fide fees for legal representation in a criminal 
matter would be exempt from prosecution under the safe harbor. 
Specifically, the last sentence of § 1957(f)(1) defining “monetary 
transaction” as to exclude “any transaction necessary to preserve a person’s 
right to representation as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the 
Constitution”166 should be deleted. In its place, a new § 1957(g) should be 
added defining the safe harbor in terms of the representation, not the 
 
165 See id. at 773-75 (discussing the Fourth Circuit’s concern with adopting a more lenient 
interpretation of § 1957(f)(1)). 
166 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) (2012). 
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transaction. Section 1957(g) could read: “This section does not apply to an 
attorney who receives fees he reasonably believes are bona fide in exchange 
for representing a client in a criminal investigation or any proceeding arising 
therefrom.” This construction aligns more closely to the safe harbor originally 
proposed by Congress while also allowing prosecutors freedom to prosecute 
the client if it later turns out that the funds were not bona fide.167 The same 
sentence should be added to the end of § 1956. 
“Bona fide” is defined as “[m]ade in good faith; without fraud or deceit” 
or “[s]incere; genuine.”168 Courts should have no difficulty applying this 
standard. The definition implies a reasonable duty for the defense attorney 
to investigate the potential client’s source of funds. The attorney would not 
need to undertake Herculean efforts and examine years of the client’s tax 
documents, but the attorney would likely be expected to do more probing 
that simply asking the client whether the funds are clean. Assuming the 
attorney undertakes a good faith effort to determine that the potential client 
has enough clean funds to pay the legal bill, enacting an amendment 
establishing a safe harbor for an attorney who receives fees he reasonably 
believes are bona fide in exchange for legal representation would go far to 
ensure that criminal defendants receive the representation to which they are 
constitutionally guaranteed. 
B. Post-Indictment and Civil Forfeiture 
Additional amendments are needed, however, to protect criminal defense 
attorneys who deal with potential clients who are already under indictment 
or who are facing a civil forfeiture complaint parallel to a criminal matter. 
Since indictments and civil forfeiture complaints give the defense attorney 
actual knowledge that the client’s funds are potentially tainted, a creative 
solution is necessary. Congress could define “actual knowledge” so as to 
exclude information gleaned through an indictment or complaint, but the 
likelihood of such a measure being passed by Congress is extremely low. 
Instead, Congress should enact a statute requiring that a potential client who seeks 
to pay a defense attorney with potentially tainted funds for post-indictment 
representation or representation in a civil forfeiture matter parallel to an 
ongoing criminal case be referred to a magistrate judge or special master, who 
would determine a reasonable fee that the client could pay the defense lawyer 
out of the tainted funds. The statute would apply only to defendants who 
 
167 See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text (discussing the originally proposed safe harbor 
provision). 
168 Bona fide, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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were indicted or are facing a civil forfeiture complaint for a violation of 
certain white-collar offenses that likely involve tainted funds. 
Magistrate judges or special masters would serve as much-needed 
middlemen between the potential client and the defense attorney. Since the 
magistrate judge or special master would be the one who determines the 
appropriate fee that the client may pay the lawyer out of the potentially 
tainted funds, the defense attorney need only deal with the potential client 
on an arms-length basis. By insulating himself from the potential client and 
accepting only a judicially approved fee, the defense attorney would be 
released of his burden to personally investigate the source of the potential 
client’s funds, allowing the attorney to focus on vigorously investigating the 
client’s case and effectively representing the client’s interests. 
The proposed statute would ameliorate the numerous problems facing 
criminal defense attorneys and the criminal defendants who seek to hire 
them. Criminal defendants will be able to obtain counsel of their choice, and 
defense attorneys will be able to represent the defendants without fear of 
prosecution or fee forfeiture. The attorney–client relationships that are 
formed will not be hampered by distrust or conflicting incentives, and third 
parties will be able to pay clients’ fees when appropriate. Without the 
proposed statute, defendants would be forced to rely on already  
over-burdened public defenders, as private criminal defense attorneys realize 
that representing criminal defendants who may pay their legal bills with 
potentially tainted funds is not worth the risk of prosecution or fee forfeiture. 
Courts have held that a criminal defendant who is the subject of a civil 
forfeiture action has the right to a hearing before his assets are forfeited if he 
seeks to use the funds to obtain counsel of his choice for the parallel criminal 
matter.169 Congress should recognize that civil forfeiture actions and parallel 
criminal actions are essentially one case and should not differentiate the civil 
action from the criminal action. If Congress interprets parallel civil forfeiture 
actions in this way, the logic of ensuring that criminal defendants are able to hire 
counsel of choice to represent them in both criminal and civil matters arising 
from the same conduct becomes clear. 
 
169 See United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1203 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (holding that 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments entitle a criminal defendant seeking to use restrained funds to hire 
counsel of choice to an adversarial, pre-trial hearing where the court evaluates whether there is a 
probable cause to believe (1) that the defendant committed the crimes that provide the basis for the 
forfeiture and (2) that the contested funds are properly forfeitable); see also United States v. 
Bonventre, 720 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that a defendant has a right to a Monsanto hearing 
if the civil forfeiture action may affect the defendant’s right to counsel in a parallel criminal case if 
the defendant can show that he does not have alternative assets to fund counsel of choice). 
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CONCLUSION 
The current state of the § 1957(f)(1) safe harbor is summed up well in the 
Criminal Tax, Money Laundering, and Bank Secrecy Act Litigation treatise: 
 [T]he precise contours of the exception are still unclear, and fraught 
with peril for the defense attorney who knows or is willfully blind to the fact 
that his client is paying for services with tainted funds. To a large extent, the 
safety zone created by the exception depends upon prosecutorial discretion 
and restraint. Even if defense counsel is charged but ultimately acquitted 
under the exception—and some juries may not warmly embrace the 
procedural safeguards created by the Sixth Amendment—an indictment 
alone is disastrous.170 
As the current safe harbor is written, it is both over-inclusive and  
under-inclusive. Section 1957(f)(1) is too broad because by focusing on the 
transaction and not the representation, it protects the client who pays the 
attorney even if the funds later turn out to be dirty. On the other hand, the 
provision is too narrow because, as shown in Blair, it can allow for the 
prosecution of attorneys who receive legal fees that turn out to be tainted. 
The current safe harbor is also insufficient because it allows for prosecution 
under § 1956 and for forfeiture of attorneys’ fees. As discussed throughout 
this Case Note, the status quo poses numerous problems for the criminal 
justice system. The attorney–client relationship is chilled, the ability of a 
family member to pay for a relative’s legal fees is curtailed, and funds received 
as attorneys’ fees are at risk of forfeiture. 
This Case Note has proposed a new statutory safe harbor framework that 
protects attorneys who accept legal fees that they reasonably believe are bona 
fide, while also giving prosecutors freedom to prosecute the client if it later 
turns out that the funds were dirty. Specifically, the proposed legislation 
tightens the statutory framework both for pre-indictment clients and clients 
who are already facing an indictment or a civil forfeiture complaint. First, a 
statutory amendment to § 1957, with a parallel amendment to § 1956, should 
be enacted to protect attorneys from criminal liability for accepting bona fide 
legal fees to provide representation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to 
defendants who are not yet under indictment. Second, Congress should enact 
a statute requiring that a client already facing a criminal indictment or a civil 
forfeiture complaint for a violation of certain white-collar offenses that likely 
involve tainted funds be referred to a magistrate judge or special master, who 
would determine a reasonable fee that the client could pay the criminal 
 
170 PETER D. HARDY & CAROLYN H. KENDALL, BLOOMBERG BNA, CRIMINAL TAX, 
MONEY LAUNDERING, AND BANK SECRECY ACT LITIGATION 291 (2010). 
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defense lawyer out of the potentially tainted funds. Amending the money 
laundering statutes in this way would eliminate the current circuit split, 
provide much-needed clarity to the criminal justice system, and allow 
criminal defense attorneys to go about their work without having to worry 
about prosecution or fee forfeiture for accepting potentially tainted funds. 
Until new legislation is passed and the money laundering jurisprudence is 
returned at least to its pre-Blair state, criminal defense attorneys would be 
well served by undertaking a full investigation to determine the source of 
each potential client’s funds to minimize the risk of becoming criminal 
defendants themselves. 
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